

CUBA

Options:

- 1) Thygesen sent message to U.S. on Nov 5;
message to ISH, State, WH, & heights of crisis,
27 Oct (Saturday) (E. Thompson writing memo for
President on Sat & Sunday). Little attention.

Also, N-N attacks in Nov. "S.U. take care of it"

Also, UK-US cooperation with cooperation over India.

(Kagan away on India).

- 2) US ^{Proposed} offered request for Clinton Laikins to come to
NAC on week following Cuban crisis.

Consider events leading up to Cuba as a failure of
"communication", distancing, inference (S.U. misreading of
US response; US misreading of S.U. intention, activities,
actions. Warning is successful, accurate, timely
inference (+ prediction), and, failure of attempt to prevent.

(Does crisis warrant confidence in efficacy of warning,
offering lessons of failure to avert crisis or recognizing it?)

revision of warning, ... over, under

Sicent. Aug 22, '68

History

[How sure were we that we would attack?
What made us sure?

How important was blockade? JFK speech?

How worried was the com 23 B-1? Would
blockade have been enough to win?

[If SA-2 destruction of U-2 was unauthorized — how
much did it worry K? JFK?

If U-2 overflight was unauthorized, how much did it
worry JFK? K?]

[Black Box problem. Why did nations take the
actionable actions they did? Under what circumstances
would they act the same — or differently?

Not enough data, especially for inputs-output study —
consider input structure changes. So, need look at the results?
WHAT ARE SIGNIFICANT (if improving) OUTPUTS OF THE PRE?

[Did SU think that "the problem" was to get

some missiles on island — not, ^{by plane} ~~by plane~~
prior to detonation? Explain difference in SU move
to Cuba, US move to Turkey; why didn't latter create
crisis? what reasonable acts might we do?]

Would SU think it important to get postpone
detonation by a few days or weeks — even they were
there? What if they look — as that our first
look showed ready missiles?

Why would readiness have made us willing to attack?

How important in supporting our response was a
feeling that Turkish missiles were rather intolerable
to US, indefensible?]

Missile reports in August: rather killed to SAM: a
missile, or blown in front

[Were there false losses - Aug. 1st
from intell. analysts, as well as refugees?]

Suggestive experiments after mid-19th century

I specify you in Riverdale Park being granted
by Sons, Culver Street.

hair { 2) oval combs by Carter side : we have IRCA and
noise? " " : some stone weapons

4) righting of truck coming with wheel parked like MARCH

Early 1st. restrictions on living, based on DC/instatement

That it ^{is} ~~there~~ should be greater possible photo relief

Aug 21 - Bapt. initiation on res. 1st of 24 Aug. 1967

Early Oct - Oct 11. continuation of 31-32

Oct 12²² special class system.

[Lower: "crack analysis" depth just after mid-? ft; Sept 13 - fresh.]

[Dynamic pattern? Early stage of potential crisis

→ tension, fear of 'incidents' that would disrupt

→ tension, crisis peak of crisis (not yet believed)

to be high) → control on 3) info-gathering

(U-2 recon, ship movements) → delayed recognition of problem
increased impact of "conflict"

and on a) alert, readiness

[What if SALT had been structured,

even structured prior to Oct 14?

consider dependence on photos]

→ increased readiness,

flexibility

→ increased vulnerability

Both increase chance of a first scramble

[Anyone seeing it a first scramble can

should win it there off to. Have they?]

[Yet, if incident does occur, consider effect of that

on a) recon, b) readiness

SALT?

U-2 over China; U-2 over

Sept 30?

Salt Lake

WHAT IF THESE TWO HAPPENED PRIOR TO AUG 29?

(Would it come in 24-25 report; but night same taken

agents reports more directly: night on aircraft, 29, Sept 20?

[Notes on progress of Santa flight being just when
it was -- not later -- comes!]

[What would have been difference of San Diego to continue
on same course?]

Sept 10: San Diego objection to Santa flight plan extensive
preference to one flight (Santa + Santa, Santa + Santa) to look for
Santa 4 flights, Santa

[Why are prepared to look against it west end?
Assumption on spread of installation?] [SAMP?]

[What mission on 10th cancelled? why?] [Where?]

Flight for 16th delayed then cancelled for weather. Over Paris.

17 left: cancellable flight. 18-21: cancelled for weather.

Not flown when weather good. 4 days before takeoff.

Between Sept 5 - Oct 14, 5 scheduled missions cancelled
for bad weather over target; no other flown, but absconded.

[Did the Committee foresee this problem?]

Mission started to over come from 22-26

Edgell page completed Oct 7.

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Synaldis, west of Tucson
[Wggs are checked with
insects?]

Sept. 1901 on Oct. 9 to cover hold

Q. 4. MC regard for extensive modification

[Letter and his inspiration about?] Special Group suggested.

Example (by N. Brown, D. J., U.S., C.M.) of alternative means of action,

because of increased risk; meeting on Oct 9 to hear

reports (see ?); planned flights: Bad weather on 10-13-51

2. Why does CA plan create issue of unifying international waters, with S+C peripheral reason here not?

[Lethal weather on Oct 14-22 — 20 million flowers —
compare to 18-22, Oct 3-14?]

Johnson? Johnson, Koon?
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2nd meeting meeting with Paul (who left in afternoon)

One of first suggestions (Paul?) : that like U-2 in 1949
("do not" have been treated) : a "mistake" to be "corrected"
"advised"
by Richard in 1949.

[Could we have ^{seen} this? How fast? How?]]

[Did we feel that that operational status of weapons
would influence us - that early discovery would make
us more willing to act?]

Retention of (?) question (Paul?) : why not first accept
situation? (NOTE: this would support our retention of
U-2 in 1949, if we wanted that! Any action?)

[One position on Cuba involves back of keeping out
because of any prediction of this?]

[What access to Oral History interview on tapes on Cuba]

Study charts of strike (W4055?) 500 miles, 75
Bundles for 1913-14, rather 100 miles for 1914-15,
1000 for 1915-16. Insurance needed 2000 miles, 4000 miles.

many
Johns River: 2 groups, "clim" & "post." [W4055?]

2. C. L. ... journals ally of Jones; no blockade
of open? ...
ST-2. ... Jones could not be accepted.

Johns. off. without Press.

We in strike: danger to the country; to the country;
moral points of striking without warning, particularly in
its home on the inevitable (?) Cuban Civilian Committee.

[Any thought to demonstration strike?] [John?]
[JWS opposed this on 16 Oct]

Blockade regarded as more useful, provocative,
than limited air strikes against American land. (10-2-1961)
[How does that look now?] ...

Blackstone "act of war" on Oct. 6. But could
attack instead this incident: [prelude by German?]
"is it a declaration?" [ready?] Payments from Berlin
should have might not show to make an issue [! ?]
[? ? ?]
Blackstone's photos were with him.

Found to be black.

Through the 5: "silver life" of his country for
withstand of German question; important no progress on
Berlin.

[No touch on Berlin — as reported?]

G. instructed to make it clear that to Berlin was only
for the purpose of contributing to the defensive capability
of Cuba [act, defensive purpose?]

FK: no threat of invasion. To Cuba; would have been
glad to give assurance to that effect if K had asked.

[So: guarantee was no new concession?]

G: Saw specialists in Cuba were giving training in handling
certain kinds of defensive war [they were operating
NROTC, SAM.]

Epilogue Did G know and know? Phil DeBryen did not
know.]

Friday night. Both lines of action (blockade + large
scale) were given to State & Defense. (How? 2-4-5?)

Shapiro worked on paper for Pres.

W. Bundy paper was read

Frank wrote of speech written by Garrison. (Pres.)

Sat. morning: Johnson scenario discussed (Pres.)
(Johnson?)

Pres: 2:30. Everybody, with Sherman, Shapiro, Smith

Christie: large; almost certainly loss + failure

with invasion (?), Cuban civilian casualties would

be high. Strongly conceivable loss would not repeat

withstand ^{SEE} JFK plan as presented, was "not surgical,"

was "up to grade" (Cory?) required massive commitment

Operation was "only sense of action compatible with

our principles. Only a small risk the world "pull the

trigger."

Evening: JFK talked to Hore. Later, to Hore.
(Res. Text: just this)

No bargain on basis, Anderson has a problem

If construction continued, might be necessary to strike

on the revenue basis, and if it would be catastrophic, especially since SAC leads.

If receiving ^{information} makes even more sense against US, it might be necessary to insure, but not to make sense against Cuba; however, it might be necessary to make a compensating strike on SU.

[Any planning? Analysis?]

Sunday morning

Till 10, when final approval to plan, possibility we would plan with strike.

2130 NSC, with Anderson

(after dinner!)

[How common was "scenario" approved? Did

a. fiction instead this?

Monday

11:30 am & 8:00 pm
Pete - message to families

5:00 pm meeting of NSC (McDonnell)

Established Espionage - moral appearance of decency,
sing me song

Hypothese of not saying state or invasion had been
considered (as rejected):

Why no preventative action? Lack of "hard" evidence
to convince. This is opinion of experts that SC
missiles were unlikely.

Note: Congress reaction - in state, invasion

(see Taylor, McN first view?!)

Macmillan reply to Rusk briefing 6 Monday: it's not just
not so much on precedent as on unprecedented condition of
the modern world in a nuclear age.

Must be ready for retaliatory action against Berlin, as well!
as pressure on western part of the Free World defense system.

Monday, 21st.

[First mt. - Back - DeLong - talk, 22 Oct.]
- through.

10:40-11:45 Mett and Anderson.

Back bridging on modern weapons. (?)

Tuesday morning:

Back to Hall: We've won a considerable victory,
you and I are still here. [Did Rank believe this?]

[Mentally: Rank & SFC did not; issues were
not immediate solution, but shipping road.]

[Why did SO persist in denying presence of miracle?]
[What did this "convoy" mean?]

Exposure: 10: 3 subcomities. Berlin, adverse planning.
common.

Putze. common. inter-allied relationships.
check with her

Advantages of not telling allies they would not be
able to see hands, & would be free to discuss

When

in 1945's case.

From that Mac would have JFK to urge
against some course of action.

(Graham?)

Tuesday: Memo for JFK (via Post): Taylor, Talbot & Poston

on some support for MRBM to Europe; privately

urge Jinks to place out position as soon as MLE

available? predictable? Represents by Exotic Area to

Special from briefing MRBM to Canada on ME (last, MLE?)

SEE

7 for Proc of Introduction

8 for McN said 25 per ships enroute to Cuba,

this course unchanged [TRUE?]

in part 24 hrs.

Friday morning 10. 1960 (with Hoover) (Debar)

Work on minutes continuing. E. [Plot former draft
of low crisis]. On this discussed.

Does still pending.

Deal of Formin + Scali; primarily under UN supervision.

Bridge by Castro not to accept offensive exception (?)

Also; bridge by US not to invade.

Scali, Helms, Rusk. (Short. Brownfield?)

Scali - Formin 7:45: real possibilities, time short.

Also, Rusk at UN and by low. Subm. to Helms.

[WHY?]

Letter began writing at 6; had been translated
by US into Russian. [so, not influenced by Scali]

Letter: if answered by Rusk, and if plot recalled, this would
indicated change in policy in other two, the question of the
destruction, and only of the agents which you call offensive.

but of all other armaments we would [?] would
not different.

If armaments were given by the Gov. and the Gov.
of the US that the US itself would not participate
in an attack on Cuba and would restrain others from
actions of this sort, if you would recall your fleets,
this would immediately change everything. I am not speaking
for Fidel Castro, but of that that he and the Gov. of
Cuba, evidently, would declare denoulement and would
appeal to the people to get down to peaceful labor.
Then, too, the question of armaments would disappear, since, if
there is no threat, the armaments are a burden for every
people. Then, too, the question of the destruction, not only of
the armaments which you call offensive, but of all the
armaments as well, would be different.

Between the two above statements like wisdom I propose:
we, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for

Cuba, will not carry any kind of demands. You would
declare that the US will not invade Cuba with its
"forces" and will not support the any sort of force which
might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the
necessity for the presence of our military specialists in
Cuba would disappear.

Exposure recovered at 10 pm to dawn.

Agreed to treat as bona fide offer. Drafting on a point
State and W4. (Re action of Berlin, in Turkey,
though, no explicit offer to remove; suggested Castro's consent
needed; asked guarantee of Cuban security — difficult
historically for US)

[Did Nitzze, Pastore know?]

as 100% blockade, mobilizing US aircraft also (?) or a possible air strike.

8:10 morning

Excom at 10. Discussing draft reply [check]
Memorandum, Radio Moscow letter: offer to remove;
Tulay, inspection.

Albania (check table): U-2 shot down.
U-2 surplusing (has fighter scrambled). Within hour,
fire on plane. Castro vowed to shoot down plane
[Soviet system] [under?]

Notes loaded.

[Under: JFK attacks on Ridge, Bundy]

Decision by Pres: pick out of earlier letter basis for
solution against Castro.

Excom at 4: consider proposed replies.

2 planes fired on Pres. approved three messages to C
letter sent at 8:05 pm.

Note that night, message to Khrushchev: all NAC.
Excom at 9: discussion of additional steps next day: such
as SCL blockade, mobilizing US aircraft ships (?) or a possible air strike.

11-3-57 (15 Dec 57)

Possible Intell. Warning of Soviet Withdrawal in the US

Alternatives, threats, as: warning
 conditional? indication of our own intention
^{statement}
 evidence of conditional decision
 (Would threaten - under risk -
 but, give odds that he would
 carry it out? Does he
 expect to?)

Try to get Khrushchev to do A, which others don't want to do:
 get them to agree to threaten to do A if third party S
 does & doesn't to P; get them to commit US prestige, etc.
 Then $pr(A) \equiv pr(S \text{ will lead to do it, etc.})$ - what may be
 higher "If your boots come up to 20 days supply,
 we'll come down."

Thus, reflect the fact that doing A not only hurts US
 but also hurts S, whom we wish to influence. 1

UNC

- [The danger of explosion in mass confrontations rests partly on values, emotional reactions to events as they occur, but partly partly on theories as to the "inevitable" course of events or the nature of the opponent or the "possible" alternatives. Cf: "dangerous theories"

(any use of one nuclear must lead to all-out war - lesson)
(Explosive theories). [Mobilization - War]
[Inability to tell apart from total war] [When did Iran "decide on war"]

Possibility of warning: What happens - as to possible enemy plans, courses of action, goals, values, will evidence be related to? intent

(also problem of observational/reporting uncertainty: given instruments, what is probability that X has occurred, given a report, even claims, that X has been observed by means A ? Then, what is $pr(H_0 | X)$?

UNC

To interpret SU moves (preparation, deter, threats, increases
decision to attack — "How likely to
they have a high probability of attack."

On, that war could occur?

At this time, long-range data — things they would be doing
if prob of war or attack were high: then try to
observe them: a) with high prob b) with high probability
in observation; c) early.

[This "unequivocal" indication can be valuable without
(2), given (b) + (c).]

To interpret, must have some good info on US-Allied
moves that may have triggered (French planes in
consider) SU "response." To identify possible "signals"
in advance, so as to monitor or suppress, know:

- 1) Our operations, intentions; 2) SU collection sources
(French books etc.);
- 3) SU model of our behavior; hypotheses they are testing, and
likelihood functions. Their likelihood functions, "interpretations" of
weight of evidence, might depend on "level of tension."

5. What led K finally to withdraw IL-28's?

What if guarantee had been lifted earlier?

3L Note effect of K failure to consult Castro before 28 Oct

on SU-Cuban relations; & SU later difficulty in

extricating IL-28's.

DD/I Remark Staff: ^{7th} Low Missile Base Venture in Cuba

ORR Cuba 1962: K's miscalculated bet. 13 Feb 64

CRISES

1. Interpretation of motive from choices must take account of all factors in decision-theory analysis (at least): utils, prob, (cut risk).

e.g. SU knew US would see in Cuba; but how much risk of US military action could they accept?

1 e.g. When did K conceive mission? (late '61? or early '60?)

2. How did Soviet attitudes change during study?

What hops were rejected? Why? What info was not available earlier? What conclusions were likely then?

3. When did Congress/newspaper reports of missile start (before real prob?) (early Sept?); How synchronized with actual events?

^{meant}
1. Also they may: SA-2's to prevent overflight, protect missiles.

NO, perhaps for 2 SA-2 sites (2 East Germany)
ABM/ICBM any '63
5. Has SU ever precluded against U-2 again? How much can be inferred from lack of effort? (Failure to preclude with SA-2's is more significant.?)

6. Photos as confirming, establishing validity of, info from other sources. [Analyze role of photos as evidence: for hypotheses suggested/generated by other means.]

7. As info note distinction between comm and electronic emanations. (latter, too, can be 'comm' — as well as 'information'.)

8. Background/context: SU aimed to others: nature + scale. ^{+ thing.}
Indonesia, Iraq, Egypt

9. Collateral reports of construction, etc. in first half of '62 not supported by photos. What conclusions?

a) Reports could not be "basis for assuming"...

b) But were they without basis? (Probably not: perhaps based on knowledge of personnel, not detected by photos)

c) Did availability of photos, then, "reduce info available to govt"?
(compared to info available to those without clearances?)

10. Why were missiles transported clandestinely: but not constructed covertly?

11. CHART various time-tables.

12. Correlate: US public statements

Congress/news assertions

but guesses, estimates

actual

various kind of evidence

} RAND?

13. Compare McN intell briefing to Congress.

14. Why omitted to peripheral recon of on 5 Sept? How did

(all 14 Nov)

Arban / Sano probably interpret this? (They were aware).

What was attitude/interpretation of this by US military? Still?

Why resumed on 14 Oct?

Have they ever been activated previously? Practice...
SA-2's could have been activated before 14 Oct; could
have been activated by mid-lift in west: to screen from
recon.

16. Did 5 lift mission cover later sites west of Havana?

17. Implications of extreme mobility/flexibility of SA-2 (MREM)
systems for US planning, inference.

18. How did SU deployment practice in Cuba with SA-2's
MREMs compare to practice in SU & elsewhere? How does
this affect inferences made from SU data?

(Concomitancy; lack of reuniting; field operation...)

(variation in reuniting; $> \frac{1}{2}$ never reunited).

19. Analogy: dependence of an SA-2 site on acquisition by other sites & EW, to raise it from standby condition so it can react fast enough (can't stay in firing condition more than 20-25 minutes); this limits capability for independent action.

(But U-2 is slow enough so individual missile can react; also, does height ~~low~~ increase radius of SA-2 coverage?)

20. Implications as evidence of lack of photo confirmation (e.g. of SA-2 missiles on launchers) when there was no photo coverage.

21. Aug. 5 showed activity at 2 sites but negative on many others (valuable on those not covered); on Aug 27 (?) many seen already in place. Most of these had had gaps in coverage of 23-61 days. W/f?

22. In studying linkage of crises, for some the Bay of Pigs must have been a key element in forming attitudes. What?

23. See Horvitz's group on reorg. of photo recon after Cuba.

To what does Unger attribute delay in maturing the J-3, JCS operations — and the final improvement?

24. Compare analysis of SA-2 deployment ('revealed values') to Heymann study of 1959. What is explanation?

(Question not equivalent to "What was 'their' goal?")

Analyze difference.)

Note redployment on 'reflection'

— after crisis [IS THIS WHY/WHEN 'REFLECTION' OCCURS?]

25. SAMs in west replaced by first work in Sept.

26. KEY 'EVIDENCE':

- a) Ability to ^{deploy or} operate SAMs earlier, and failure to do so.
(also MRBMs)
e.g. (by delaying IRBM site construction + MRBM deployment by weeks; instead of starting 1 1/2 months before AD system activated on 27 Oct).
- b) Ability to conceal deployment in Cuba (for longer) + failure to try
e.g. by delaying introduction of unique equipment: missiles, fuel + oxygen tanks.
- c) Failure of SU to perform ^{operational} capability to use SA-2s to
demonstrate recon. or to defend MRBMs.
- d) Activation of SAM radar + C & C nets on 26-27 Oct: not sooner,
and then apparently sooner than planned; Moscow links on 23-24 Oct.
ignoring of Cuban military comm system.
- e) IRBMs increased range of SU threat to US.

27. Note dramatic emergence of SAM radar on 26 Oct +

AD C & C on 27 Oct. (known to whom, in gov? public?)
How interpreted at the time, in US? How long to
analyze? How related ~~to~~ ^{by} ~~to~~ ^{to} shooting
of U-2 on 27 Oct? How was latter interpreted by
various people at time?

28. What evidence is there that SU considered concealment from U-2 flights (as distinct from preventing U-2's, or restricting deployment) possible? (IRBM sites particularly hard to conceal? Then why not delay starting them?)

29. Lack of covertness as indicating low prob of US response, in SU minds.

(Were they indifferent to nature or timing of US non-military response?)

30. SU also ignored Pres warnings on 4 Sept

(NOTE: overflights stopped on 5 Sept, after threat of "gravest issues" if offensive missiles found).

13 Sept. during interview.

[What were WH-Pres expectations during this period? Staff background of these statements?]

31. Lack of identifiable missile activity at time of 4 + 13 Sept statements: so SU could not (did not?) interpret Pres statements as based on knowledge + indisputable acceptance.

(13 Sept. first report of IRBMs approaching Cuba, below date & why)

32. Ambiguity of failure to alert:

a) Hostilities not feared

b) Situation very delicate, fear of effect of alert - as - info (bad message), assuming it would be seen.

(Failure to carry out actions SU would be sure would not be observed, less ambiguous).

c) People in charge of alerting not in a problem.

33. SU protection against ground observation: vs. US, Cuban, would public (Cuba outside Havana off-limits to reporters 25 Sept.)

34. SU origin of plan probably not till late '61; final commitment to start (?) probably not till April-May '62 (evidence?). ^{decision could have been} ~~Sept~~ ^{as late as May} ~~beginning of July~~

Probably early preparation in Feb-March, perhaps on contingency (or exploratory) basis.

35. Report in Jan '62 that K intended to complete production of missiles this year — to resolve Berlin.

36. Analyze how missile move would have "strengthened K's bargaining position" over Germany.

37. Relation to SC decision to build up in Indonesia (Feb-April '62 decision): possible commitment there of Sov forces against NATO member (Holland) if conflict in West New Guinea. Study?

38. Castro assertion of authority over "old Coms" in March-April '62: assumed stable political climate (?)

39. 5018

Compare to US.

32. SU leaders ready to reduce strategic misdeeds (?) imbalance
against SU drastically & rapidly. with (4) IRBM sites,
SU would have been more than 50% increase over end-62 levels.

40. How much — and only — would SU now have
discredited US resolutions, will to resist? (How
would US bargaining power). Role of US public
statements. What could have affected this?

Also: 1) substance
(in various cases) } of SU military power.
magnitude

2) deterrent to US } in SU eyes
attack on Cuba } in Cuban eyes

3) demonstrate support to ally

4) disarmed Chinese criticism

5) if line of retreat, leverage (focus of attention) for
removal of US subsidies bases.

|| (if role of K's statements in handling Cuba in Dec
is creating a problem for him, given our solidarity) K's
statement, leading to this: 1963

40. SU news high rate of US ICBM/Polaris activation
to start in '63, swamps effect of Cuba.

So, temporary gain.

41. Note K statement on 12 Dec 62: 20% of all aircraft
of SAC on air alert.

20 Nov - announcement of withdrawal of Z1-28.

42. SU option from 22-28 Oct: insure crisis did not escalate

test US resolve

if US firm, salvage

43. No reference to K-JFK letters: same, 26 Oct letter
as interpreted in JFK public reply. Did study have access?

44. 31 Oct: SU eager to limit ON inspection of sites.

Laos
Reminded [Hidden episodes — Log of Page,
Turkey — can lead to important — but creates,
unlocked, & unknown to others — 'learnings' by
some participants, and to "increase nations" by
them that are concealed from others.]

[How much to allow some of Turkey? CINCs?]

5) Alerting process: in different agencies; plans,
^{usually to} actual use, actual execution

6) Termination Phase; the payoff

10) Survey Postcrisis problems

e.g. ²⁾ effects of leaving left agencies, public
allies in dark

b) effects of ad hoc org, by-passing

7 neglect of other problems (Slylyalt)

d) role of these effects in setting up a new
crisis, dynamic linkage

e) ^{crisis} demobilization; budgets

f) political impact: effect on issues
image
votes

g) new personal relationships with

allies, enemies, staffs

(left left out of decision making,
Mac in Cuba, K in Cuba)

Tasks (e.g. Brimington):

1) Tabulate interagency linkages: instances, and classes, & sequences of couplings between agencies in a crisis: initiations, requests for info, approval, action, manning, statements, comments

Survey: By-passing, slip-solution reporting, ad hoc along; use of "non-professionals"
WHY? EFFECTS? FUTURE?

2) Alliance linkages

3) Enemy linkages

(4) Search for "should-have-been" crises: "missed" crises: Hungary, Cuba, Wall; Talmann & Berger, 1939.

4) Search for "might-have-been" crises -- e.g.

internal crises. "incidents" residents. How/why were they prevented?

Are all "real" crises failures? were they preventable?

5) Tabulate supra linkages: kinds, impacts, reasons.

6) Tabulate uncertainties, doubts: effects (final resolutions).

7) Survey planning within gov; use of checklists, SOP's.
OVER

Are there little-known crises, or selected crises
that repay study? (Gibson was the crises that
failed to be identified; hence, knowledge of surprises,
consideration independence.)

Questions:

1) Do you feel that crises studies you have
seen have systematically left out important factors —
instructed, left gaps to?

2) What are factors likely to seem important to
top people and be unknown to lower? Insider/outsider
— (e.g. domestic political; financial)

3) How many goals sought by leaders differ from those
we would infer from the inputs — def. cables,
int. data, — and from input, outsiders & observations —
all

4) Have has your own experience in crises changed your
view from earlier ones? (as to the nature of crises
problems)

5) How experience — one crisis directly influenced your view of another?

Handwritten:

Did SAMs lead to fear of "incidents"? Was that:
fear of the US public reaction, being "exposed"
forcing Balan into action it felt unnecessary +
unavoidable.

Like the unwillingness to release Further Report.

What would have been the reaction to a short-lived
circumstantial, say, by a public no demonstration of
flight, reaction of Cuban sovereignty: wouldn't this
have been in rules of the game?

Black Box

Known: All anyone but top level sees is

misses going in (some of them) and miss going out.
Cable J.L. 20th

and they see it's gone in the wires and then

it's lights - the actions, directions...

What really goes on inside the Box? What
really worries the President or the Top Staff? What
do they feel uncertain about, & care about? (And in
retrospect, were they right to focus on those?)

Why is it important to see within the Black Box

Given: problem was how to keep Israelis & Egyptians from
fighting.

Express how to keep Israelis & Arabs from fighting.

["No one was worried about Jews coming in."]

Cable express: "No one - including me - believed that
Soviet would do such a thing. There were reasons for calling
it a hoax - including weather - but none of them would have

been enough if 'anyone' had thought there was a real chance of
freaky missiles." EAS AT PEACE HARBOUR OVER

Turkish missiles: YAN first proposed to get them out
much earlier than 1 April. ^{over} RK helped stretch out
all Polaris back — back — around on scene,
so it was a "small net victory" — gain (?)

"But — how does Pines get the system
moving? How does he show he really wants something?

He wrote the strongest cable I've ever seen in 1984:

'I want the ROK Army reduced by 6 divs — not 3
or 4 or 5 — and I want it in 6 months.'

Francis Latham, ROK Army reduced by 60,000 men.

"How much of our reaction to Inuy was caused by
moralistic figure at our office for having the gall to
carry out that operation without consulting us, overtly,
attempting to conceal & deceiving us?"

26 March

Notes: JFK's greatest confidant, unless RFK was more;
friend since 1938; Boris sister was Kathleen's
best friend (KK killed in plane crash); Kathleen married
Boris's best friend cousin. More hesitant to write memoirs,
for fear of impression. What was JFK doing, telling such things
to a Critchley.

Interagency Post-Mortem Study *

ACDA - Larry Holmes *

1 version of Southard - McG, RFK

Pres just wouldn't do anything but pictures.

RFK reaction on seeing pics on 15 Oct:

"I know what these are. Oh, shit!"

McN: informed only by "hard" int: photos, SI, ...

"Agent reports 'aren't evidence.' ("just opinions, guesses...")

[On camouflage: were nits, too, just for protection against attack, not photos? i.e. did SC assume that infrared would be used in photo recon?]

[But they were wrong. "Cuba 1962" study apparently
aimed to refute it. The McC adjointed
his assumptions?]]

Increasing frustration of intell. analysts, last week
in Sept; agents' reports ignored at State, was on
speculation.

[How do people think, now, "I was wrong."
e.g. KSR recalls that about Aug 30, at WH,
he among others reacted to pics of SA-2's: "Aha,
that's what they're seeing. People who have never
seen a missile before would think this was a big
missile." He assumes now he was wrong; there
were both. But there were not; MRBMs did not come in
till mid-Sept.

Problem of Mistaken Revaluations: Wrong Reasons."

24 March

W's:

Agent reporting: more of it in front work in Sept reporting objects bigger than SA-2's [even they connect?]

Even more in Sept:

State wouldn't pay attention.

Around 5 Sept: order to USIB to "cease speculation on missiles in Cuba." [Why? JFK & RUK just didn't want to be bothered by this stuff?]

[Note: last flight 5 Sept: because ~~Q-2~~ SA-2's in?

To avoid "incidents"? Because JFK now convinced that only SA-2's were involved?] [SAC-EIA fight?]

[See McC primed, agent testimony.]

McC's theory conviction, as soon as he heard of SA-2's (late August): "Why SA-2's? To shoot something high. What's high? U-2's. Why shoot U-2's? To prevent observation of something serious. What's serious? MRBIVs."

Held to the conviction; if he had been beet, virus would have had more impact.

~
Lifesize image July 25

S4M sites: first activity Aug 5; first units seen upland by
last Oct 16; system activated & open 6-17 Oct.

One unit deployed 26 Oct -

Ground force: camp seen west Aug 29; occupied Oct 16

MSPR: No visible activity, Aug 29, Sept 6; first known -

IRSI site first visible activity Aug 29 (recognized?)

IR-23: first known activity Sept 28

[No mention of evidence outside Cuba, e.g. in
SV, letters to Oros; informal channels (disruption?)

No mention of evidence of activities outside Cuba to Oct
activity (e.g. to air alert) (as in East Germany)

No mention of evidence of SV plans of movement to
Cuba activity.

No evidence

as to intentions

Limitations of photos: only 33 MRBMs identified - Cuba
before observation of 42 being withdrawn.

Not known whether warheads & missiles ever material
at any.

Not known whether any simulated launch exercises
involving erection on launcher (could have occurred
before first coverage or at night!).

Full repair cap. would have required 43 missiles.

Probably ~ 42 IRBM sites (4 under launchers) damaged:
24 + 16.

Kyngsgaard - Stevenson 5 Nov; K to Brit. Int. Police 72 Nov;
said warheads had been removed.

How surprise in Nov. was to resume US that offensive
missiles were being withdrawn; statements that warheads not
present would not have shown. (?)

22,000 Pows on 22 Nov: most common est.

SAM deployment to give island-wide coverage, not
max protection of military sites.

Redeployment by early '63.

Most in west explained by port bank in light;
could have been up. But no evidence they were
retreated individually or as port-segment till 26 Oct 62.

First missiles on site about 18 Sept (assume 16 Sept),
last miss 16 Oct, on site 19 Oct.

Others: 22, 23 Sept, 2-3 Oct, 6-8 Oct, &

If warheads, virtually certain some missiles could
have been launched from one or more sites, by
the sites first identified 14 Oct, and that some
could have been launched from all⁶ by 20 Oct.

No evidence of effort to alert or "break" any part
of MRBM force ^{in Cuba} during crisis.

[Study says nothing of attempts to mislead
Poles on intent or actions. ?]

More than 200 reports of missiles in Cuba prior to
Jan 62. Also reports of construction & equipment in
spring '62 in areas where SAM sites located later; but
photos failed to reveal.

But, reports may have reflected low personnel radars
planning, preparation
associated with buildup that began by mid '61
in late July. Preserve my base general report
(wrong) of activity.

[Warning ? for preparatory actions to lead to
reports that will be disproven, discredited later,
true reports.]

[Agents may report inferences, speculations, as facts.]

No persuasive indication that Low and Packer brought
to State Station prior to 22 Oct, nor that subsequently
they were placed in position suggesting hostilities were
imminent.

In late Oct, funds during & after 22nd Party Congress.
It, funds replenished in light of Vienna in Jan '61,
Berlin Wall in August [Big of Pigs? Southland?],
circulation of myth of how 100M spent in Oct,
mostly econ problems, continuing with Chicom.

Intention to establish a military base in Cuba probably
had origins in policy deliberations of that time; fund.
commitment funds not till spring.

K may have felt that US understood "rules of the
game" — trade bases on, opponents properly are facts of
great power life, not provocation to war.

[& no asymmetry]

Assembly of IL-28's went on slowly but steadily
mid-Nov.

Although ^{not} aware of US action at least by
July '62 + now so after, they didn't rush to complete
40 engines or parts. Probably goal-date of first half of Nov;
not intended to screen buildup.

Amund's note addressed between first week in Sept.
- mid-Oct. Can't tell whether by mid-Sept.

Indication that Sov leaders regarded risks as low.
Could have — but didn't — plan buildup as significant
operation in which defenses screened offensive weapons
or minimize time between first identifiable GRM risks +
the readiness of whole system.

Ignored possibility of US overflight. Choice
inevitable (?) unless Sov leaders (?) judged confidently
that US would acquiesce, or not react militarily — so US
poss. of US detection was not critical to success or failure.

One cruise missile unit deployed operationally, from ^{on west}
island location, about 25 or 26 Oct;

one armored group moved out of campsite about
same time.

27 Oct. U-2 shot down, probably by SA missile.

(Causes can't be determined)

Oct: all or virtually all 416-21 continued based
at same airfield where assembled; no unusually high level
of activity, not dispersed till first week in Nov.

No discernible activity at 3 of 4 ground force
campsites, where armored groups remained highly
vulnerable to attack. Some boats also inactive.

By 1 Nov some work began dismantling.

Some indications of deliberate effort by Sove to dismantle
assemblies as possible that missiles & boats were given.

(No attempt to shelter; IRBM also dismantled; cooperated in
pulling back tanks at sea when challenged.

22-28 Oct

in Cuba.

Some actions taken to improve combat readiness, but most of them not till several days after Pirov speech, and then appear to have been earlier than intended; and other elements of Sov forces showed little or no change in status.

~ indecision & confusion?

* Most immediate reaction [in Cuba] was establishment on 23 & 24 Oct of two direct command comm. links between Moscow & Cuba. (prearranged? No smaller operation till 28 Oct) &

* AD system operational 27 Oct; however? expanded steadily after.

At sites, construction continued; some training?

Vehicles & equipment dispersed & camouflaged; AAA positions & trenches improved. May have been recession, so much by low-level recon starting 23 Oct as by Pirov speech, for low-level mission must have expressed some at the sites until the danger of attack.